The global wave of democratic retrenchment has not spared North Africa as seen in the cases of Tunisia and Sudan, where democratic transitions have stalled or regressed into autocracy. Both states are attempting to transition from single-party authoritarianism. In both cases, economic crises exacerbated by COVID, the Russian-Ukraine war, and involvement by external actors stymied the fragile transition process.
But there are also clear differences in the role of European powers, the strength of political parties and civil society actors, and discourses of national identity. In October , the Sudanese military declared a state of emergency, disbanded the civilian leadership and removed Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok from office, placing him under house arrest.
A month later, Hamdok was reinstated. The prime minister and General Abdelfattah al-Burhan then appeared on national television and signed a power-sharing agreement with the Forces of Freedom FCC - an umbrella group representing opposition groups, military, armed and civilian - that would ostensibly allow Hamdok to form a government and hold elections before July The Sudanese military stepped in three years after a broad-based protest movement toppled Omar al-Bashir from office in April Various attempts at international mediation led by the so-called Troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway have not been successful.
In both cases, economic crises have been exacerbated by COVID and the Russian-Ukraine war, and involvement by external actors has stymied the fragile transition process. But there are also clear differences in the role of European powers, the capacity of political parties and civil society actors, and discourses of national identity. Consequently, policy in critical areas like judicial reform or security sector reform has been shaped more by deal-making between state and private sector elites making between private sector rather, than by the Tunisian electorate.
The intra-elite political struggle underway in Tunisia is the result of two divergent visions of democratic governance, both presented as an alternative to party-based electoral democracy. As Grubman explains, one side viewed deliberation and consensus-building between elites as a viable approach. This was the thinking that underpinned the Constituent Assembly election of , the National Dialogue of and , when then-President Essebsi brought together a bevy of political parties and civil society actors, who then produced a charter for a new government.
